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The global proliferation of networked computer systems within the public and private sectors 
presents an increased opportunity for malicious cyber attacks to disrupt the daily functions of 
governments, national emergency systems, the global economy, and our modern way of life. The 
potentially pandemic nature of network failures presents opportunities for states to work together 
to identify key infrastructure sectors of shared interest and formulate international norms and 
strategies to protect them from cyber attacks and prevent cascading failures within modern 
society.1 Nation-states that share information infrastructure critical to modern social functions 
will have a vested interest in protecting these systems from cyber attacks while mitigating their 
own inclination to attack these same networks. 
This paper outlines the state-to-state cyber threat to critical-system infrastructures and the role 
international agreements can play in limiting this threat. The paper has been structured as 
follows. It begins by defining a critical system and discussing the actors who pose threats to 
these systems and the motivations behind their decisions. This is followed by a detailed 
description of a hypothetical scenario that depicts the methods by which one state could attack 
another state’s critical infrastructure, to include the motivations behind the attack. In conclusion, 
it makes recommendations regarding the development of an international agreement designed to 
limit this specific type of attack. 
Critical Systems   
This paper uses the USA PATRIOT Act’s definition of a critical system as: “systems and assets, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”2 This infrastructure serves 
as the foundation of several key industries that are critical to modern social functions: the 
electrical, telecommunications, water, chemical, and energy sectors.3 These industries use 
industrial control systems (computer-based control systems that are used to monitor and manage 
sensitive processes and physical functions) that are increasingly reliant on modern advances in 
telecommunications and computing—such as wireless transmitting devices, control system 
computers, dial-up modems, and the Internet.4 Of all types of industrial control systems, the most 
common types are supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed 
                                                 
1 Ralstona, P. A, J. Graham, and J. Hieb, "Cyber Security Risk Assessment for SCADA and DCS Networks," ISA 
Transactions, vol. 46, no. 4 (October 2007), pp. 583-594. 
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control systems (DCS) and programmable logic controllers (PLC).5 Additionally, many of these 
systems are connected to the Enterprise Computer System associated with respective industries. 
Threat Identification 
In Live Free or Die Hard, Hollywood’s version of a coordinated cyber attack against U.S. 
critical infrastructure, a highly motivated computer terrorist pays unwitting computer hackers 
around the world to develop individual parts (functions) of a computer program that he plans to 
use to hold America hostage. Properly combined, the complete code gives the terrorist (a 
disgruntled former Department of Defense security expert) the access and subsequently the 
ability to shutdown power grids, disrupt U.S. government networks, air-traffic control systems, 
public traffic systems, etc., bringing U.S. society to a screeching halt.6 The terrorist is 
successfully stopped before he can conduct his final attack on the U.S. financial sector, thanks to 
the heroic efforts of one off-duty police officer and one computer hacker.  
Stopping an attack of the magnitude portrayed in this movie would have involved several 
agencies working in close coordination with one another; however, the movie does a good job of 
depicting the human threat and the type of virtual coordination computer criminals, terrorist 
organizations, and state actors can employ if they are intent on carrying out a cyber attack. This 
particular attack would have required an enormous amount of resources and dedication on the 
part of the attackers, an effort which would have been worthwhile only for extremely motivated, 
malicious actors. In contrast, critical systems are under constant threat from malicious actors, 
such as poorly trained or disgruntled employees, hackers, computer criminals, terrorists, and 
state actors.7 While each potential threat poses a different level of risk to critical systems, only 
three types of malicious actors are motivated enough to generate the greatest concerns about 
carrying out a successful cyber attack against national infrastructure: computer criminals, 
terrorists, and state actors. 
Computer criminals and terrorists pose a significant cyber risk to critical information technology 
infrastructure and systems due to their motivations and ability to recruit talent. Computer 
criminals and terrorists are motivated by a range of factors, including the destruction of 
information, monetary gain, unauthorized data alteration, blackmail, exploitation, revenge, 
competitive advantage, and economic espionage.8 Both types of organizations are able to recruit 
                                                 
5 USA Patriot Act; For a simple overview of control system types, see Micrologic Systems, “SCADA Primer,” 
available at www.micrologic-systems.com/primers/scada.html, or Dan Capano, “Distributed Control Systems 
Primer,” available at waterandwastewater.com/www_services/ask_dan_archive/toc.htm. 
6 Bruce Willis, Justin Long, Timothy Olyphant, Live Free or Die Hard, directed by Len Wiseman (\Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corporation, 2007). 
7Gary Stoneburner, Alice Goguen, and Alexis Feringa, “Risk Management Guide for Information Technology 
Systems: Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology,” Risk Management Guide for 






talented individuals of differing backgrounds either through promises of monetary gains or by 
virtue of shared ideology. Consequently, a successful cyber attack by either type of actor would 
likely result in a monetary reward or political statement. In the case of organized crime, network 
data flows associated with financial transactions would be heavily monitored by information 
technologies, forcing criminals to raise alerts as they attempt to siphon off electronic funds. 
These goals require criminals and terrorists to quickly acknowledge their attacks, which weakens 
their effectiveness, as information technology security personnel can quickly search for the 
exploited vulnerabilities and implement security countermeasures (also known as system 
hardening). These countermeasures limit sustained damage to the overarching systems. The 
threat announcements also serve as a mechanism for identifying individuals and organizations to 
target in law enforcement/military counterstrikes.  
State actors are the most capable threat, as they have the ability to funnel significant resources 
and talents into these efforts, and see cyber attacks as an appropriate countermeasure to an 
overwhelming threat.9 State actors can have several motivations for conducting cyber attacks, 
ranging from economic espionage or political blackmail to the desire for a military advantage in 
the form of asymmetric warfare.10 State actors can deem cyber warfare to be a vital national 
interest and put the full force of government resources (military and civilian talent) behind it. 
Additionally, like in the movie scenario, state actors also have the ability to outsource this skill 
set to proxy parties.11  
What separates cyber attacks perpetrated by state actors from those done by criminals and 
terrorist is how success is measured. State actors do not need to announce their attack to achieve 
success. The direct results of a cyber attack, for instance, the disruption of services or espionage, 
are best achieved and sustained by maintaining covert cyber capabilities. These covert 
capabilities also help insulate state actors from the political fallout (diplomatic, economic, and 
military retribution) associated with publicly indentified cyber attacks. According to the 2008 
threat assessment presented by then-director of national intelligence Michael McConnell, Russia 
and China are the two nations with the greatest cyber capability and the desire to conduct cyber 
attacks against the United States.12 Perceptions of the Russian and Chinese cyber threats are 
based on several incidents and statements, including the attacks on Estonia in 2007 and on 
Google in 2010.  
In April 2007, a real-world scenario similar to the one captured in Live Free or Die Hard played 
out in the former Soviet republic of Estonia. Malicious actors successfully used remote-
controlled computers dispersed over 76 different countries to target and conduct Distributed 
                                                 
9 John J Kelly, III and Lauri Almann, “eWMDs,” Policy Review, no. 152 (2009), p. 39. 
10 “Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems,” p. 3. 
11 For example, see David Eshel, “Israel Adds Cyber-Attack to IDF,” Aviation Week, February 9, 2010.  
12 Michael McConnell, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” written testimony to 





Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against key Estonian services such as banking, 
telecommunications, media outlets, and even the Estonian Ministry of Defense.13 Many cyber 
experts, the Estonian government included, believe that Russia was behind the 2007 Estonia 
attack and suggest that the attack was a response to the Estonian government’s removal of a 
Soviet-era sculpture from a square in its capital city, Tallinn.14 Similarly, before the 2008 
Russian invasion of Georgia, there were several DDoS attacks against the Georgian 
government.15  
The recent global recession highlights the expanding tensions between the rising power, China, 
and the current superpower, the United States, on economic, political, and military issues.16 For 
example, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the U.S. president’s meeting with the Dali Lama have 
generated criticism among Chinese military leaders.17 To further intensify the state of affairs, 
several Chinese generals have openly advocated modernizing military doctrine to include cyber 
capabilities.18 Many cybersecurity experts view the recent attacks against Google servers by 
Chinese actors (at a Chinese University that has been known to send many of its graduates to the 
People’s Liberation Army) as evidence of this. This action in particular has generated criticism 
from U.S. government officials.19 
Vulnerability: Prevalence of Threats 
The interconnectedness of the Internet is what makes critical systems vulnerable to both benign 
and malicious attacks.20 An unintended consequence of the reliance on new computing and 
telecommunication technologies is that it creates systems that are increasingly vulnerable to 
cyber threats from overseas actors.21 According to Joseph M. Weiss, a cybersecurity expert, until 
2000, some industries did not fully understand the possibility that these systems could be 
networked together to increase efficiency and lower costs.22 As such, the security of stand-alone 
systems fell well below optimal efficiency and reliability.  
                                                 
13 Joshua Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,” Wired, vol. 15, no. 9, September 2007.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Dennis Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” written testimony to the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 29, 2009. 
16 Tom Gjelten, “Chinese Attack on Google Seen as Cybertheft,” National Public Radio, January 18, 2010.  
17 John Pomfret, “U.S. Sells Weapons to Taiwan Angering China,” Washington Post,  January 30, 2010.  
18 Larry Wortzel, “Preventing Terrorist Attacks, Countering Cyber Intrusions, and Protecting Privacy in 
Cyberspace,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, U.S. Senate, November 17, 
2009.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Hugo Teufel, “Privacy Impact Assessment for Einstein 2,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National 
Cyber Security Division, May 19, 2008. 
21 Siobhan Gorman, “Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated by Spies,” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2009. 
22 Joseph M. Weiss, “Control Systems Cyber Security: The Need for Appropriate Regulations to Assure the Cyber 
Security of the Electric grid,” testimony to the Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Emerging 





Another factor is that the reliability and availability of critical systems is typically more 
important to industry than requirements of confidentiality. As such, anything that adversely 
affects the former is frowned upon. Weiss also notes that information technology security 
practices, such as port scanning, which can be used to gain access to a system, can damage older-
generation PLCs and are often discouraged.23 Security activities such as port scanning also use 
large amounts of computer system resources. These resources are shared with more functional 
features of PLCs and are not available to them until activities such as port scanning have ended. 
Resource sharing occurs at very high speeds but still produces a noticeable degradation in system 
capabilities overall. Also, many of the control systems used in the United States are outdated, as 
they were created during a time when the greatest risk to our national infrastructure was posed by 
physical attacks or a disgruntled employee.24  
No one network infrastructure is more important than the production of a continuously reliable 
supply of electricity, the backbone for all other systems.25 Michael Assante, the vice president 
and chief security officer of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) put it 
this way: “We, as an industry, must also consider the effect that the loss of that substation, or an 
attack resulting in the concurrent loss of multiple facilities, or its malicious operation, could have 
on the generation connected to it.”26 
 
Threat Scenario: An Energy-Sector Cyber Attack 
In 1997, the concept of NERCnet was born. The system was designed to allow “all” participants 
in the electric power industry to communicate in order that businesses could run reliably and 
securely. NERCnet is a shared communications infrastructure platform designed to securely 
receive and transmit “proprietary” energy information between NERC facilities. At the time, 
many of these businesses did not have robust connections to the Internet, so it is unlikely that this 
network was “impervious to outside ‘attack’ while being open to all intended users.”27  
Weak information technology security measures in one business’s network create vulnerabilities 
for the entire system. Because of weak security measures, two attack scenarios are possible. In 
the first, a nation-state “outsources” a DDoS attack against control systems to take them off line, 
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26 Michael Assante, “Critical Cyber Asset Identification,” North American Electric Reliability Corporation, a letter 
to “Industry Stakeholders,” April 7, 2009. 
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shutting down portions of an electrical grid or the entire grid. A second scenario could involve a 
nation-state taking control of this architecture and using it to elicit a reaction from the attacked 
state. 
There are two methods for hacking into any computer system: the first is through brute force, 
manually scanning target networks from the Internet to determine weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
that would be key to exploit; the second is to exploit human errors.28 Criminals and terrorists can 
employ either method, but as mentioned earlier, state actors pose the greatest threat to these 
types of SCADA systems.  
Assumptions  
Throughout the following hypothetical attack scenario, we make several assumptions about 
likely state-to-state cyber campaigns. The first is that the attacking state (state X) has a group of 
sophisticated hackers that are familiar enough with computer security, architecture, and 
programming to successfully complete an attack against another state (state Y). Second, we 
assume that this team has been given the authority/freedom to act on behalf of the attacking state. 
Third, the attack’s objectives are well outlined, i.e. the attack is meant to give the attacking state 
a strategic or tactical advantage over state Y. Fourth, the hackers of the attacking nation have 
already co-opted several geographically dispersed and unrelated computer systems (botnets) to 
use as their attack platform, in an effort to obfuscate the attacking state’s role.29  
The particular scenario described below assumes that the attacking state has already identified a 
NERC facility as the initial target of their cyber campaign. In planning the attack, the hackers 
decided to exploit human errors to gain access to systems. 
Identifying a Target Network 
The first step for the attackers is to gather as much information as possible related to the target 
computer systems and their security postures through a technique known as footprinting. 
Footprinting involves performing computer-network reconnaissance by employing computer 
security tools and techniques to reveal the target’s Internet profile and computer network 
infrastructure (e.g. Internet, intranet, remote accesses, operating systems, employee profiles, 
etc).30 The ultimate goal is to reduce a target to a collection of computer systems (technical 
network information) and resources (social human information) that can be exploited by the 
attacker. Given NERCnet’s structure, an attacker interested in disrupting an electrical substation 
would first gather as much publicly available information about NERC facilities and any 
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29 Jivesh Govil and Jivika Govil, “Criminology of BotNets and their Detection and Defense Methods,” Proceedings 
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connected management companies. For the purposes of this scenario, a fictional entity, 
NNCompanyZ, manages the relevant NERC facilities.  
Attackers would gather both social and network-related information. Network information that 
could be gathered for an attack includes: Domain Name System (DNS), Internet-accessible 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses (cyber street address), computer system architecture, services 
running, OSs, etc. A DNS correlates a computer’s IP address (ex. ###.###.###.###) into a word 
that people can more readily remember. Using DNS query tools, such as NsLookup, an attacker 
can take NNCompanyZ’s Domain Name NNCompanyZ.com and identify an IP address 
(192.168.0.4) associated with one of the company’s computers.31 The attackers can then use a 
function known as Ping to determine what type of OS is associated with the IP address 
192.168.0.4. For instance, if a Ping sent to 192.168.0.4 returns a response of Time To Live (ttl) 
128 the attacker has gained several pieces of valuable information: machine 192.168.0.4 is 
operational; machine 192.168.0.4 is connected to the Internet (potentially accessible remotely); 
machine 192.168.0.4 is running a version of Microsoft Windows operating system; 
NNCompanyZ likely has additional machines running Microsoft Windows operating system 
(associated services); the attacker should focus on Windows operating system vulnerabilities and 
exploits.32 
Social information that could be gathered for an attack includes: company web pages, subsidiary 
organizations, geographical location details, personnel contact information, security postures, 
current events, disgruntled employees, etc. If an attacker inserts the previously gained IP address 
of 192.168.0.4 into WHOIS websites, such as Whois.net, the attacker could identify contact 
information for the individuals associated with NNCompanyZ’s website: full name, email 
address (joe.systemadminstrator@NNCompanyZ.com), location, and phone number.33 WHOIS 
queries will also reveal the names of other machines. The attackers could then use this 
information, particularly email addresses, to gain information that could be used in social 
engineering techniques through popular search engines (Google, Yahoo, etc.), to identify group 
forums and other email addresses used by employees of NNCompanyZ. Additionally, an attacker 
could use these same search engines to see if any company employees are members of social 
networking sites such as Facebook or Myspace (these sites are often linked to web-mail 
accounts), using these to gain additional information on employees.34  
Gaining Access to the Target Network 
The next step in the attack would require the attackers to gain access to any machine inside 
NNCompanyZ. This is often referred to as a foothold. To accomplish this goal, the attacker 
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would use previously gained network and social information to launch a phishing (pronounced 
fishing) attack against targets of opportunity, NNcompanyZ employees with low computer-
security awareness due to poor training. 
The attacker could then set up a mirror version of the NNCompanyZ website 
(NNCompanyZ.com), known as a spoofed website, which would look almost identical to the 
original (NNCompanyZ.com).35 Included in the web page could be images, known as web bugs, 
of legitimate items (i.e. company logos, etc.) and cookies that can monitor and store key private 
information about visitors such as type of web browsers used, IP addresses, passwords, and the 
number of site visits.36 The spoofed webpage could also contain hyperlinks that are embedded 
with malicious tags or scripts created using cross-site scripting techniques.37 The attacker could 
then send unsolicited emails, using a fictitious @NNCompanyZ.com address, to all potential 
victims at the company that redirect them to the mirrored site. Any NNCcompanyZ employee 
who visits the mirrored site from work will unknowingly execute the malicious code onto his/her 
work computer (192.168.0.4) by clicking any of the links, creating an opportunity for an 
additional computer program known as Rootkit to be left behind, providing the attacker a 
mechanism to covertly copy directories, update system registries, and use local-user applications 
to communicate to the Internet.38 Additional programs or spyware, such as keystroke loggers, 
could also be implanted within a victim machine(s), and the information they harvest can be 
forwarded to the attackers to enable the next step of the attack. 
Network Enumeration 
Once the attackers have established a foothold within the network, the next step is to perform a 
more robust and intrusive form of internal footprinting to gather information necessary to access 
systems associated with the overall objective of the cyber attack. This technique is referred to as 
network enumeration. Network enumeration involves a process where additional users’ accounts 
(specifically privileged accounts such as system administrators’), shared services, software, 
internal network computers systems, and operating systems are identified.39 Attackers could use 
tools and techniques similar to those used in step 1 (Ping and NsLookup) to gather internal 
network information, but additional custom network survey tools (Nbtscan, SuperScan etc.) 
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36 Stefanie Olsen, “Nearly Undetectable Tracking Device Raises Concern,” CNET News, July 12, 2000.  
37 “Cross-Site Scripting (XSS),” an entry on the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP).  
38 Moheeb Abu Rajab, Jay Zarfoss, Fabian Monrose, and Andreas Terzis, “A Multifaceted Approach to 
Understanding the BotNet Phenomenon,” Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet 
Measurement, pp. 41-52, October 2007. 





could also help to create a network topology that could be used as a road map to get to the 
ultimate target, the control systems.40  
Returning to the attacker foothold machine, 192.168.0.4, the attacker can begin to look for a 
NNCompanyZ machine that connects to the electrical substation’s network. Because this 
machine is running Windows, the attacker can use NetBIOS-based tools such as Nbtscan. By 
issuing the command C:\>nbtscan 192.168.0.0 /24, an attacker could gain information on other 
internal computer systems such as their host names, IP addresses, associated users, and MAC 
addresses, as well as to identify any network shares that could host other closely held 
information.41 Network mapping tools are commonly used by system administrators, and if 
192.168.0.4 is used by a system administrator, many of these tools may already be installed on 
the computer system, for the attacker to access. Accessing passwords obtained from the 
keystroke logging software installed earlier, the attackers may be able to remotely log in to the 
system administrator machine, 192.168.0.6, and find documents detailing the location of the 
machine that can remotely communicate with the electrical substation control systems. If the 
documents list the machine’s IP address as 192.168.0.7, the attackers would easily be able to 
determine that the system exists and is running a version of Windows. 
Identify Vulnerable System Services & Programs 
As a next step, the attackers could identify exploitable vulnerabilities within the target computer 
systems in order to gain access to them. Unlike earlier steps, where the attackers simply tricked 
NNCompanyZ employees into installing malware, the attacker would have to identify all of the 
services and programs running on the machine and correlate them to known vulnerabilities. This 
can be accomplished by using network tools (SuperScan, Netcat) known as port scanners.42 
Identifying security-patch updates and querying systems to see if they have received them is an 
additional method for pinpointing vulnerable systems.  
Port scanners attempt to connect to remote TCP and UDP protocol ports to determine if services 
associated with those ports are running/listening. From the system administrator’s machine, 
192.168.0.6, the attacker could issue a NetCat command (C:\>nc –v –n –z –w1 192.168.0.7), 
which would attempt to connect to each port on the system and return a response of open for the 
ports that it can reach. In this case, one response would be: [192.168.0.7] 23 open. This would 
indicate that Port 23, which is associated with the command Telnet, is open on the 192.168.0.7 
machine and is able to remotely connect into the control system. The attacker can now tailor 
exploits that remotely target Port 23. Additionally, the attacker can develop/find exploits for 
other open ports.  
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Security patches are “critical” updates to software programs and operating systems issued by 
manufactures to address known security vulnerabilities and to protect against viruses and worms. 
The patches can be pushed out to targeted systems remotely, or system users can go directly to 
manufacturers’ websites to download them. Attackers often research newly released patches 
because many people opt to manually download patches instead of having their systems 
automatically updated, thus allowing their systems to remain vulnerable for an extended period 
of time. In the attack scenario described above, the attackers can identify the most vulnerable 
system services by comparing the services running, discovered through port scans, to recently 
issued patch updates for the same services, using standard search engines such as Google.43  
For instance, the attacker could identify a recent Microsoft Windows patch that has been issued 
for several Windows OSs, one of which is currently running on 192.168.0.7. The machine has 
not yet received the patch, because system users are concerned that any modification will disrupt 
the control system, causing the electrical substation to shut down and producing a massive power 
loss.44 Using additional malicious code (viruses, worm, custom scripts, etc.) based on this 
particular vulnerability, the attacker could successfully exploit 192.168.0.7. Once access is 
achieved, the attacker could implant the system with backdoors and rootkits, which would 
provide continuous access to the system for later visits.  
Covering their Tracks 
The primary goal of sophisticated attackers is to surreptitiously break into computer systems to 
ensure prolonged access to compromised machines. Once a security system administrator 
identifies a compromised system it is his duty to remove the system and reduce the attacker’s 
ability to maintain unauthorized access. Audit logs are the primary tools in the system 
administrator tool belt for detecting unauthorized system access. In ideal circumstances, these 
logs contain all network transactions, and a savvy system administrator can develop scripts and 
programs to quickly identify erroneous actions. 
Conversely, a savvy attacker will take the time to edit these same logs, removing any indication 
of their presence and their backdoors/rootkits.45 In general, an attacker tries to mitigate his 
detection and complicity throughout an entire attack. By using a Botmachine (192.168.255.303), 
he can obfuscate the true IP address from which attack commands were issued (192.168.155.33). 
The hypothetical attacker would know that the NNCompanyZ system logs include the IP address 
192.168.255.303 and would take great pains to remove this IP address from all computer logs. 
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Additionally, an attacker can use a rootkit such as Hacker Defender to achieve greater stealth and 
create a backdoor.46 
 Achieve Final Objectives 
For the purposes of this scenario, let’s assume that the attackers maintain access to the 
compromised systems until they are caught or given a direct order from state X. During this time, 
the attacker could either collect as much information on the end-target system as possible or 
begin a DDoS attack.47 The DDoS attack would begin shutting down the control systems and 
subsequently the electrical substation. 
State X decides to maintain accesses within NNCompanyZ and the connecting electrical 
substation in state Y. It also directs the attacker to identify other NNCompanies within state Y to 
gain complete access to its electrical grid system. It could use this access as leverage in the event 
that hostilities between the states arise as a consequence of territorial disputes over Island XYZ. 
 
Exploring International Agreements on Cybersecurity  
The above attack scenario illustrates several problems facing efforts to stem cyber attacks against 
critical infrastructure. First, a disruption of state Y’s power grid weakens only state Y, where 
state X’s electrical system continues to run unhindered (provided state Y is not prepositioned for 
a retaliatory cyber or military strike). Second, the architect behind the attack, state X, has 
strategic diplomatic and military incentives for conscripting hackers to gain control of state Y’s 
electrical system. Third, proving that state X is connected to the attack will be very difficult; the 
use of hackers creates a secondary layer between state Y and liability for the attack. An 
attacker’s ability to operate in more than 192 countries simultaneously means that there is little 
likelihood of being indentified.48 Finally, in the unlikely event that the attacker is identified, the 
limited patchwork of domestic and international laws and punishments would not sufficiently 
deter other attackers.  
Recent cases, such as the 2007 “Uppsala hacker” and the 1994 conviction of Julian Assange 
(founder of Wikileaks), depict the problems that domestic and international laws confront in 
attempting to deter international and domestic hacking. In the case of the Uppsala hacker, a 
conviction in Sweden did not guarantee that the offender would also be prosecuted in the United 
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States.49 Meanwhile the fine levied against Assange following his conviction on 25 counts of 
hacking and related crimes was relatively small.50  The only way to successfully prosecute an 
attacker is for nations to build a common framework or set of standards that discourages attacks 
from occurring in the first place. This framework must also establish mechanisms to prosecute 
and convict cyber perpetrators, with the penalties tough enough to deter other would be 
perpetrators. 
Creating such an arrangement would be a challenge, as it would require legal and technological 
cooperation among nations who actively guard their technological capabilities as a matter of 
national security. Any framework or international agreement that would seek to decrease states’ 
internal motivations to transform cyberspace into a platform for attacking civilian facilities and 
institutions, while increasing the number of cyber barriers to nonstate actors’ intent on 
conducting similarly malicious cyber campaigns, would need to be sufficiently broad and 
sufficiently detailed. At a minimum, it would require the creation of a new international 
organization responsible for the collective protection and management of the information 
technology infrastructure supporting critical facilities and institutions. This organization would 
be responsible for working with specific industries to create open-architecture systems based on 
new international standards. And it would also be responsible for staffing newly formed 
International Network Operation Centers (iNOCs) that are capable of overseeing day-to-day 
network performance, rapid threat detection and prevention, as well as sharing and coordinating 
threat information with signatory states and private-sector companies. Signatory states would 
have to develop domestic legislation to support the legal implementation of any new 
international agreements. 
Prior Attempts at International Cyber Defense 
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime was the first international treaty designed to 
address the global nature of cyber-threats and recognize the risks to financial institutions, critical 
infrastructure facilities, and government systems.51 In 2001, the Council of Europe (which 
includes 25 members of the European Union and 20 additional European nations) along with 
Canada, Japan, South Africa, and the United States convened to develop a legal convention to 
deal with the international threat of cyber crimes. The meeting was partly in response to the 
devastating effects of the September 11th terrorist attack in the United States, and partly in 
response to the increasing number of criminal cyber attacks against European financial 
institutions.  
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The convention that emerged from the effort identifies several key areas in which nations can 
work together to deter computer crimes. While the convention’s main focus is cyber crime, it 
also addresses several key issues relevant to future cyber treaties that are likely to focus on 
politically motivated cyber attacks against critical infrastructure: data and system interference, 
misuse of devices, search and seizures (trans-border), and real-time data collection. However, the 
convention does not directly address the issue of cyber warfare. Another limiting factor is 
Russia’s and China’s nonparticipation in the treaty due to concerns about the potential violation 
of their sovereignty. 
Mitigation through Risk Sharing 
Any future international agreement to limit the threat of cyber attacks would require the 
participation of all nations with strong offensive cyber attack capabilities, including Russia and 
China.52 Unless the nations with the most to gain are properly motivated to participate in an 
agreement, the effects will be minimal. The fundamental challenge will be to motivate all 
necessary states to agree on how to manage the risks posed by critical systems in order to 
decrease the strategic motivations of cyber attacks.  
In general, nations that agree that there is a shared risk to a common resource will be more 
inclined to share in the protection of that resource.53 Therefore, the scope of any agreement 
should focus on systems that major nations feel they have strategic reason to protect. It is a 
daunting challenge to identify the information technology networks that need protection when 
nations (specifically Russia, China, and the United States) view the Internet in different ways—
for example, as either a strategic/sovereign asset or a common resource. But it is not an 
unprecedented one.54 Several instances in recent history demonstrate how overwhelming support 
for an international agreement resulted from a perceived shared threat: the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Outer Space Treaty, and agreements regarding maritime piracy 
and international terrorism. 
Of these three examples, the most relevant to a potential agreement on cyber attacks are the 
agreements on maritime piracy and international terrorism. The technological sophistication and 
expertise necessary to build nuclear weapons or to put weapons of mass destruction in space 
present so high a barrier to most nations that it has been easier for them to become a party to the 
NPT and the Outer Space Treaty than it would be to participate in prohibited activities.55 To 
violate or ignore either treaty, a nation would have to develop or procure specific infrastructure 
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and equipment and devote a tremendous amount of financial resources and human capital to the 
tasks. Cyber attacks on the other hand can be conducted on borrowed infrastructure that is stored 
anywhere in the world and carried out by a small number of people drawn from an increasing 
large number of computer professionals.  
The technological sophistication and expertise to conduct cyber attacks is closer to the expertise 
required to conduct both terrorism and piracy.56 Therefore, we focus on treaties and international 
frameworks aimed at bridging opposing national viewpoints on international piracy and 
international terrorism to see if it is possible to formulate a more inclusive version of the Council 
of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime. 
 
A Foundation for Future Agreements 
Major competing states have previously agreed to work together to combat the threat of piracy 
and international terrorism because they believed that piracy and terrorism posed credible threats 
to their security. We will begin our discussion with maritime piracy laws, as these are the more 
established of the two. 
International maritime piracy laws serve as the foundation on which international bodies, such as 
Interpol, defend against and prosecute piracy.57 Like cyber activities, piracy typically occurs 
beyond the boundaries of any one state. As a consequence, nations have agreed to treat piracy as 
a violation of international law, granting nations the ability to prosecute maritime piracy on the 
“high seas.” This is one of the defining principles of universal jurisdiction.58 This approach 
defines the scope of piracy as any activity that threatens lines of communication or trade, or 
regional stability. As such, nations treat the open seas as a global commons.  
Over time, national self-interest and a countries’ reliance on the maritime trade of energy have 
increased participation in piracy agreements to more than 155 nations, including China.59 Indeed, 
piracy is one among a few issues for which policies are consistent no matter what type of 
government is in power. In this sense, anti-piracy laws have helped to create international norms 
that have subsequently been applied to non-state actors who threaten common resources. 
International efforts to contain and discourage terrorism have a less even record of success. 
Terrorists share some traits and tactics with pirates, including the use of violence and fear, and 
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the capacity to act outside of national boundaries. But the spectrum of motivations behind 
terrorism, primarily political grievances, makes it difficult to collectively address it with 
cohesive international norms. Indeed, sovereign nations have only recently begun to address 
terrorism, with the first international agreement on terrorism, the League of Nations’ Convention 
for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, only being enacted in 1937. Since then, an 
additional 13 international agreements regarding terrorism have been negotiated.60 The relatively 
short history of international agreements dealing with this issue allows nations’ interpretations of 
these agreements to vary, making prosecuting international terrorism difficult.61 Universal 
jurisdiction is not as well established for terrorism as it is for piracy. 62 Additionally, terrorists, 
like the hackers in our attack scenario, can be conscripted by a nation-state to carry out an attack 
on its behalf, complicating enforcement.63  
Define Critical IT Infrastructure  
The first goal of any new international agreement on cyber attacks should be to determine its 
scope: What critical infrastructure should it encompass? This list should be designed to 
encourage participation by as many key nations as possible.64 Bringing nations such as China 
and Russia under the same treaty will be challenging, as these nations do not necessarily share 
Western interpretations of the Internet as a common resource used for the free flow of 
information.65 China, in particular, views the Internet as a strategic resource it can control and 
shape within its own borders. To entice China to participate, an agreement should limit its scope 
to specific types of infrastructure.  
One way to limit an agreement’s scope would be for potential parties to agree to a list of specific 
elements of infrastructure that are key to societal function. Parts of the financial industry 
infrastructure have historically been vulnerable to external, violent threats such as piracy and 
terrorism. Indeed, “pirates have been a major impediment to trade among ‘civilized’ states, while 
terrorism similarly causes modern commerce to stop in its tracks.”66 The global economic crisis 
of 2007-2010 graphically depicted the societal ramifications of financial system failures, ranging 
from demonstrations of civil unrest to increases in organized crime.67 Therefore, any 
international treaty should focus on the information technology infrastructure supporting 
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financial systems, communication systems (emergency systems, air traffic control), and the 
electrical systems that support the first two. In contrast, infrastructure associated with military 
organizations would not be covered by this treaty. Military organizations have insular structures 
that are separate from the societies within which they sit. Additionally, militaries inherently 
evoke national security concerns when asked to limit their capabilities.  
Financial Systems 
Cyber attacks on key financial systems pose the potential to bring the world economy to a halt. 
Due to the interconnectedness of the modern banking system, protecting this infrastructure 
would seem to be the first logical step in defining what infrastructure can be universally accepted 
as critical infrastructure. The degree to which the global economic crisis illustrates the 
interconnectedness of the world’s financial markets makes global banking networks—
commercial banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and other financial institutions that carry 
out transactions—the ideal vehicles for spurring international cybersecurity cooperation and 
norms.68 Most cyber attacks against financial institutions are carried out by criminal 
organizations; these crimes threaten the entire system because ransoms paid by one bank to 
prevent a DDoS attempt will spur second and third attempts. Additionally, banks are vulnerable 
to cyber attacks for obvious profit reasons, but they typically do not report attacks for fear of 
scaring customers away or causing a run on the bank. Private banks would be more apt to share 
this information with the federal government, if the government agreed to keep it private.  
Emergency Systems  
Even as financial institutions look to protect the data within their networks, other systems that 
they do not control remain vulnerable. Any international agreement on cyber attacks should also 
address vulnerabilities in computer network systems that are used by operations protected under 
the Geneva Convention during times of war. This sector includes fire, rescue, emergency 
medical services, and law enforcement organizations tasked with saving lives and property from 
accidents and disaster. This category should include both critical medical networks and 
supporting electrical grid infrastructures. 
Energy Systems  
These systems provide the electrical power used by all other sectors. Most electrical systems are 
currently designed to provide power to a particular region or geographical area. Thus, it should 
be possible to isolate and deem as critical infrastructure parts of the electrical system that govern, 
say, emergency response centers.69 In contrast, electrical systems that provide electricity to 
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military bases would not be covered under an agreement, unless participants had previously 
agreed to protect the electrical systems for certain facilities, such as those where nuclear 
weapons are safeguarded. Yet, as nations move to smart grids, the control of electrical grids will 
be influenced more and more by advanced communication technologies, and electricity will be 
redirected to where it is needed. This will make it more difficult to isolate certain sections of the 
electrical system. 
An International Organization 
If an agreement is to increase the international community’s (signatory nations’) capability to 
defend against cyber attacks, it must increase the community’s ability to recognize the signs of 
an attack, share critical information across disparate industries, and, most importantly, limit the 
desire and motivation for a state to attack. (Many of these issues were originally addressed in the 
Convention on Cybercrime). One way to do this would be to create an international security 
organization composed of information technology security representatives from each signatory 
state, and to task the organization with coordinating and collaborating joint security measures 
with states and industries.70  
Standards and Shared Systems: Complexity and Risk 
As its first step, the new organization could address the strategic motivations of states that 
conduct cyber attacks and spread the risks and the associated costs of defending key information 
technology infrastructure to all parties through the use of shared hardware platforms that are 
based on international standards. Using shared information technology resources would limit 
states’ motivation and capability to use cyber attacks asymmetrically against critical systems.  
Sharing resources would also dramatically shift states’ decision calculus. One suggestion has 
been to expand the concepts of NercNet and information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) to 
participating nations and create one umbrella organization capable of monitoring and defending 
all critical information technology infrastructure. The administration of George W. Bush initially 
proposed this concept in the form of the Cyber Warning Information Network (CWIN).71 The 
benefit of this type of organization would be that it would build on existing organizations, such 
as the ISACs which were developed under President William J. Clinton for the banking and 
finance, telecommunications, and energy industries.72 Information sharing is most effective when 
all parties are able to used shared terminology. The most effective way to develop a system of 
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shared terminology is to create an entirely new system based on newly designed security 
protocols and standards. 
International Standards: Reduction of Complexity 
The development of common international standards for large computer systems would both 
increase information sharing and reduce complexity, increasing cybersecurity.73 If all nations 
adopt the same standards, security practices and protocols can also become more standard, as can 
the methods employed by network security personnel to detect attacks.74 
Individual companies, industries, and governments currently develop their own security 
mechanisms to protect computer networks and data critical to their operation. The result is a 
hodgepodge of encryption schemes, protocols, network infrastructures, computer architectures, 
and levels of security, each of which reflects the understanding of the particular system 
administrator.75 Some industry experts believe that this level of complexity and diversity 
provides its own form of protection by preventing one attack from successfully compromising all 
systems–an idea that security professionals refer to as security through obscurity.76 This type of 
security often creates a false sense of protection, however, as complex systems are not just 
harder for attackers to understand but also for those in charge to understand.  
Indeed, complex systems are often less secure because complexity increases the number of 
security bugs, modularity becomes difficult to maintain, and the testing requirements and 
scenarios of vulnerabilities expand exponentially. These systems are hard to fully understand and 
more importantly they are hard to analyze. As demonstrated in the hypothetical attack scenario 
against NNCompanyZ, would-be attackers do not need to understand all of a system’s perimeter 
defenses, they simply need to isolate the most easily accessible point. If a system is designed to 
provide security through obscurity, a complex attack would be difficult to detect.77  
Creating international standards for common and familiar information technology platforms 
would decrease the learning curve for basic cyberdefenses, increasing system administrators’ 
ability to successfully defend their networks.78 Standardization accomplishes this by creating 
more learning cycles for more advanced cyber security training, which would allow network 
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administrators to identify, detect, and defeat sophisticated attacks against their systems.79 For 
example, a system administrator who has a Cisco Certified Network Associate certification and 
is familiar with Cisco routing equipment, the de facto industry standard, is far more valuable in 
the information technology market than a professional who does not have this training and 
experience. Moreover, common international protocols and standards are just that, international. 
An information technology professional in China will have the same basic understanding as a 
professional in the United States regarding the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model.80 The 
International Standard Organization (ISO)’s early attempts to define networking protocols and 
distributed applications have dramatically advanced computer development.81 Similar 
organizations could develop system-specific security standards for each of the previously defined 
critical infrastructure nodes.82 
Shared Systems: Shared Risk 
Once international cybersecurity standards are developed, nations could build a common 
computer infrastructure that is responsible for previously agreed upon systems that are too 
important to fail, essentially expanding the ideas of the NercNet to other key nations and critical 
nodes. This shared infrastructure would create a strong framework for information sharing and 
physical information technology platforms to which party nations would have equal access and 
understanding. A common system architecture would have several broad benefits. It would make 
educating information technology professionals regardless of their nationality far simpler. 
Sharing responsibility for network failures would also ensure that nations, specifically the United 
States, China, and Russia, accept shared responsibility for the protection and availability of the 
critical network infrastructure system. A shared infrastructure would also distribute the financial 
penalties of cyber attacks among the three main parties and create a shared incentive for 
identifying robust solutions to attacks. 
Any critical infrastructure node that features new computer architecture systems should be based 
on open-system design principles, with consideration for industry specific standards. An “open 
system” architecture would draw on common knowledge and expertise from all participating 
nations.83 In the article “See Past Self-Proclaimed Experts’ Open-Source Security Evaluations,” 
Michael Wolfe argues that the primary flaw with open systems is that they require trust from all 
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parties involved.84 In reality, an open-system architecture for critical infrastructure would not 
need to be 100-percent open. Making certain information available only to parties to an 
agreement would provide a certain level of trust between nations. All of the parties would also 
have a vested interest in correcting problems found within the system architecture.85 This would 
decrease system complexity, while maintaining the specific security requirements at each 
location.  
As this system develops, it should aim to include modularity to ensure that if a system is 
compromised, the entire network is not taken down with it. System administrators should also 
build in the capability to track changes to the system and return a system to its best-known 
working state. This capability would serve two functions: it would allow a compromised system 
to return to working order and, in the event that a system is improperly configured or that new 
updates reduce network availability, the system can quickly be returned to a functioning state.86 
Detection and Prevention: Technical Security Controls  
In order to create an active cyber defense, you first need to have the ability to detect system 
vulnerabilities and attacks. In the case of the NNCompanyZ, this would require system 
administrators and users to realize that all of their systems are vulnerable to attack. These same 
individuals would also need to understand that vulnerabilities to one part of the system present 
vulnerabilities to the entire system. As a first step in an open system, a system administrator 
should catalogue all network equipment that could be exposed to malicious codes (viruses, 
worms, Trojans, etc.).  
Detecting an attack on this system would require systems capable of real-time data collection, as 
outlined in Article 20 of the Cyber Convention. This requirement addresses the need to gain 
historical knowledge of attacks and to keep a running total of all the packets that may potentially 
harm computer infrastructure. Collecting data of this nature helps to detect ongoing attacks and 
is the only way to protect against live-network attacks. As part of a real-time data collection 
system, each physical location within a network actively monitors whether its systems are under 
attack—by either sophisticated or unsophisticated attackers.  
One common way to identify problems within large, robust networks is through the use of 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). IDS can be designed to flag key events based on a specific 
set of defined rules (signatures) or through anomaly-based detection.87 A signature-based 
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detection system compares network activity to previously identified threats, while anomaly-
based detection creates defined traffic lanes for network data and flags traffic that veers outside 
of these bounds. With either system, statistical, characteristic, behavioral, protocol, or traffic 
information signatures determine which information is collected.88 If something unusual occurs, 
an IDS typically collects data on the computers that generated the event: the source IP addresses; 
the source port; the time of communication; the destination IP address; the protocol used to 
communicate; and the destination port.89 
The Department of Homeland Security’s EINSTEIN Passive IDS System is the type of shared 
monitoring platform that could be implemented as part of an international agreement. EINSTEIN 
scans network traffic for malicious codes and activity using either pre-defined signatures or, in 
the absence of a pre-defined signature, abnormal traffic.90 This type of monitoring is called 
passive monitoring, as it does not seek to block or respond to anomalous network traffic.91 This 
is an important distinction, as other types of security scanning, such as port scanning, are likely 
to be viewed as unacceptable to most control systems, because of their potential to slow down 
systems and make them unavailable.92 
This reliance on passive monitoring reflects system administrators’ prioritization of network 
availability over the potential compromise of network security. Indeed, most critical systems 
cannot be taken off-line for security procedures or maintenance; both functions must occur on 
live systems/networks. To improve security and not impact availability, smarter solutions are 
needed. Were the United States, China, and Russia to develop a shared detection monitoring 
platform it would increase transparency by providing attack information to all parties 
simultaneously (mechanisms for sharing this security information will be discussed later on in 
the paper). 
Another benefit of having a robust and well-reviewed audit and security logging system at each 
network facility is that it would provide additional information about who is trying to access the 
system, both internally and externally.93 A shared detection system would need to have access to 
the same logs and data to determine the effectiveness of security at each individual critical node 
and to address weak links in the security infrastructure chain.  
In addition to subscribing to the principles of an international agreement, nations could work 
with information technology security firms to further develop virus detection and eradication 
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technologies based on international standards for each industry. This would help to ensure that 
personal computers and workstations do not serve as platforms for attacks to control systems. 
This effort would require system software to be kept up to date with publicly released security 
patches. Information from joint logs would serve as a mechanism for developing new signatures 
for IDS systems and building better anti-virus products. 
The next stage of setting up a strong cyber defense is to attempt to ensure that only authorized 
users have access to systems. This is typically done through authentication and is a key function 
of prevention. Critical industries and security experts should focus on jointly developing 
authentication mechanisms that incorporate the use of passwords, smart cards, digital certificates, 
Kerberoses, and other authentication methods. While authentication technology should be 
incorporated at all critical nodes, the type of authentication used is likely to differ from industry 
to industry. Each node’s site administrator would likely determine who can access files remotely 
based on group associations. New forms of access controls at the software and hardware levels 
should also be developed, as should non-repudiation controls, which store information about 
users for future identification, either through shared cryptographic keys or other standards. Each 
industry should adopt a special form of protected communication channels via VPNs, IPSEC, 
cryptographic protocols, etc. to minimize the threats of replay and packet sniffing/eavesdropping.  
Certain keys will undoubtedly have to be shared with governments for law enforcement 
purposes, prompting privacy concerns. To address these concerns and the potential for non-
repudiation to store user data, these new systems should include technological mechanisms to 
hide internal system transitions. This will also limit the threat of social engineering. 
Detection and Prevention: Management Controls  
The new international organization would have to be more active than the international sharing 
and analysis centers (ISACs) currently in use.94 In addition to managing international networking 
operating centers (iNOCs), the organization would be responsible for ensuring that threat 
information is shared among participating nations and that training and staffing requirements at 
the iNOCs are met. 
The structure and location of each iNOC will also be crucial. Each participating nation should 
host a center, and each primary iNOC should have an integrated staff, with representatives from 
each signatory nation, to increase transparency. A particular center’s information technology 
staff should be put through standardized training before being handed responsibility for 
monitoring network security for a particular area of critical infrastructure. Ideally, the centers 
                                                 
94 Esther Gal-Or and Anindya Ghose, “The Economics Incentives for Sharing Security Information,” Information 





will operate around the clock and take into account global time zones. This will help to develop a 
liability regime and lead to the delegation of responsibilities for managing systems.  
In developing security plans for their assigned industries, each iNOC should develop a thorough 
understanding of the type of network infrastructure that they are trying to protect. These plans 
should take the shape of formally agreed upon plans of action. To mitigate the risk of internal 
threats from iNOC employees, the backgrounds of staff given access to vulnerable critical 
systems should be thoroughly checked and standard personnel security controls, such as a 
separation of duties, access registration, and termination procedures for removing compromised 
individuals, should be implemented. One way to build trust between participating nations would 
be for iNOC staff to rotate their duties on a regular basis so that no single individual ever has full 
control of a system. 
As personnel transfer from one set of duties to the next, each iNOC would be responsible for 
structuring and enforcing training requirements and periodic refresher courses. The requirements 
should be simple: employees must understand why they are doing what they are doing.95 Users 
should be aware of safe e-mail handling policies and why they should not install any unnecessary 
software or software that has been deemed unsafe due to known problems.96 They should be 
instructed to avoid clicking on links in e-mail messages, especially in unsolicited e-mails. Also, 
whenever possible, file-sharing networks should be discouraged. Educating users will reduce 
dangerous incentives and motivate users to protect their systems. 
The network of iNOCS would ostensibly submit to periodic system audits by an international 
governing body of information technology professionals.97 The survivability of the whole critical 
system were one part attacked should be part of any audit. This will test site staff in the face of 
an attack and promote survivability systems. While such a program may create challenges for the 
hacker community, it may also discourage state-sponsored activities (professional hackers).  
Deterrence through Domestic Policies 
The final piece of an effective cyber defense is the most difficult to attain. An effective system 
needs to tilt the cost-benefit risk calculation of conducting a cyber attack in a way that 
discourages attacks. Doing this lies outside the control of any system administrator no matter 
how good he or she is. Another way of understanding this challenge is to acknowledge that no 
international agreement will suffice as long as participating nations have weak domestic rules 
and laws. To ensure that individual nations are encouraged to develop stringent domestic laws 
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and rules, security representatives to the new international organization should have the ability to 
directly communicate with domestic leadership. 
Developing strong domestic laws that criminalize cyber attacks would further bolster and 
legitimize the international régime. For example, the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Cybercrime contains several articles that address domestic policy issues. Articles 4 and 5 address 
the issues of data and system interference and how nation states should deal with them. These 
articles stress the need for nations to assume some sort of liability for actors who act within their 
borders to commit attacks. By not domestically criminalizing cyber attacks, a nation would risk 
becoming a haven for criminals and bases of operations for other nations to conduct attacks. (An 
apt analogy would be Al-Qaeda’s ability to train, plan, and conduct operations in sovereign 
Afghanistan.) Additionally, these articles define cyber attack as the damaging, deletion, 
deterioration, alteration, illegal transmission, or the suppression of computer data and systems. 
The Convention on Cybercrime’s focus on addressing the “misuse of devices” and providing for 
substantial search and seizures mechanism (Articles 6 and 19) should also be emulated in any 
international agreement. Information acquired through iNOC search and seizure operations 
would serve as the foundation for investigations into the geographical origins of attacks. The 
parties to the agreement could then assign financial penalties to the nations where an attack 
originated, assuming it is possible to identify its origins. Doing this would shift liabilities and 
financial obligations for an attack from the attacked site to the attack’s point of origin. At the 
very least, this type of financial penalty could motivate nations to develop stiffer domestic cyber 
laws, limiting potential attackers’ abilities to freely gain information and tools, and to focus on 
prosecuting major criminal masterminds instead of more middling “script kiddies.”  
 
The Possible Effects of an International Agreement on the Attack Scenario  
Were the proposed international agreement in place, the attacker(s) targeting the NNCompanyZ 
would have faced several new challenges to successfully complete their cyber campaign, 
provided that state X and state Y were members of the agreement. The attack scenario’s first 
assumption would remain intact, as nations are likely to continue to employ sophisticated 
hackers capable of both completing (blackhats) and defending (whitehats) against cyber attacks 
regardless of international agreements. The second assumption (that the attackers have been 
given authority/freedom to act on behalf of state X in a cyber campaign against state Y) and third 
(that the scope of the attack has been outlined, i.e. the outcome of the attack should enable the 
attacking state X to achieve some type of strategic or tactical advantage over the attacked state 
Y) would now change because a disruption at the NNCompanyZ and the electric sub-station 
would now affect both state X and state Y. Provided that both state X and state Y have generated 
strong domestic legislation aimed at those planning and executing cyber attacks, the number of 





Under this new scenario, we also assume that the attackers have identified a single NERC facility 
as their initial target, but because of the new international arrangements, to be successful they 
will need to be familiar with the specific protocols and equipment surrounding this specific 
facility, to include firewalls, IDS, security policy, computer network architecture, authentication 
mechanisms, etc. Newly developed authentication mechanisms would also restrict attackers 
ability to freely move from one system to the next without direct physical access and access to 
severely restricted credentials. Another roadblock would be new access standards that restrict 
employees to performing work procedures on specific equipment deemed critical, equipment 
whose access to the Internet is severed. 
Were state Q to target NNCompanyZ, and state Q was not a signatory to the agreement, a 
slightly different chain of events would occur. The first, second, and third assumptions would 
remain as they were in the initial attack scenario. In this scenario, however, defensive activities 
would not commence until the attack began. Information technology administrators associated 
with NNCompanyZ would begin mitigation and prevention once the attack was detected. 
Because all of the iNOCs would have a unified attack notification system, administrators at 
companies associated with NNCompanyZ would begin locking down their systems as if the 
attack would soon come to them. Solutions (mitigation) to the attack would then be coordinated 
among all the iNOCs instead of the local NNCompanZ iNOC. A parallel effort to identify the 
attacker would be coordinated among all iNOCs extending beyond the centers responsible for 
critical energy infrastructure. If an iNOC were able trace the origin of the attack to state A, a 
signatory to an agreement against State-to-State Cyber Attacks, state A, on behalf of state Y, 
would begin a criminal investigation. State A would be able to use all of the collected data 
associated with the attack because it is a signatory to the treaty, which would allow it to identify 
the attackers. It would be difficult to identify State Q as the instigator of the attack, but if it is, 
economic sanctions or a retaliatory strike could be legitimate options. 
 
Conclusion 
The capabilities of information technology continue to advance by leaps and bounds, and the use 
of the technologies continues to proliferate to more and more facets of modern society. The 
information technology architecture designed specifically for key critical infrastructure systems 
is likely to continue to be vulnerable unless nations instill a shared sense of vulnerability and 
protection. Expanding on agreements such as the Council of Europe’s 2001 Convention on 
Cybercrime and focusing on ways for nations such as Russia and China to cooperate with the 
United States and Europe are key to ensuring the effective protection of critical infrastructure. 
And to accomplish these goals, nation-states will have to begin seeing critical infrastructure 
nodes as common resources. Additionally, nations will have to develop strong domestic laws and 





international governance. The role of network security will need to go hand in hand with the 
development of new networked infrastructure. 
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Backdoor – This feature allows unauthorized access to system functionality after an initial 
system compromise (see Rootkits). 
Botnets – Commonly referred to as a network of Bots (derived from robot), botnets are computer 
systems that have been implanted with software that allows them to be remotely controlled by a 
central administration point. Botnets are a combination of computer shell scripts and backdoors 
that are placed on a machine after it has been exploited via another type of malware. 
CIA – An abbreviation for Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. 
Flaw – Errors that occur within information technology systems. 
Hacker – An individual that gains access to computer systems by exploiting system security 
vulnerabilities. 
Intrusion Detection System – A tool that can be used to identify problems within large, robust 
networks by flagging key events based on a specific set of defined rules (signatures) or through 
anomaly-based detection. 
Kerberos – A network authentication protocol that was developed at MIT. 
Malicious Code – A type of program or code specifically designed to cause harm to an 
information technology system. 
Open Source System – A type of system where the system design is freely available to the 
general public for additional development and testing. These systems are based on widely 





Packet Sniffing – A process equivalent to phone/wire tapping in which all packets involved in a 
client/server data exchange are captured sequentially for later inspection. 
Port Scanning – A technique used to scan a computer system’s ports to understand which are 
available for use and to define the computer’s operating system. 
Replay Attack – A network attack in which a valid data transmission is fraudulently and/or 
maliciously retransmitted to determine the origin, destination, and purpose of the valid 
transmission.  
Signatures – A characteristic of email traffic that is generated based on known malicious network 
traffic. 
System Hardening – A security measure that reduces the number of potential security risks to a 
system by removing non-essential software programs and utilities. 
Rootkit – Software that provides outside access to a computer system while remaining hidden 
from the system’s administrators.  
Telnet - A program that allows users to remotely connect to a computer. The default telnet port is 
23. 
Trojan Horse – A transport vehicle for a worm or virus that disguises itself as a legitimate 
program. Once a Trojan horse is executed, the virus or worm can be executed. 
Virus – A type of malicious code that can attach itself to system resources and harm legitimate 
system programs by corrupting, deleting, or moving important data sectors. 
Vulnerability – The security weakness of the system. 
Worm – Similar to virus, this malicious code consumes system resources while replicating itself 
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